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Summary
In this thesis I will look more closely at certain major events as they un-
folded during the recent financial crisis, before I turn to discuss some of the
assumptions underlying the economic models used to guide policy analysis,
and see if these assumptions are supported by the data.
Chapter 2 contains a short introduction to the history and development of
macroeconomic theory, and provides some background needed to understand
why there exists no clear consensus among economists regarding the most
effective way to deal with economic slumps.
In chapter 3, I go through what I believe are some of the main contributing
factors to the financial crisis. Global trade imbalances and perverse incentives
in the financial sector are central to this discussion. I go on to describe the
different stages of the current crisis, and how it spread from the financial
sector into the real economy. Finally, I devote some time to the various
policy measures taken to combat the crisis. Traditional monetary and fiscal
policy actions were implemented, as well as more experimental policies like
quantitative easing.
In chapter 4 I take a closer look at some of the assumptions made when
constructing macroeconomic models, and see if these assumptions seem rea-
sonable when confronted with data. In particular, I look at a traditional
Keynesian consumption function and the more fashionable Euler equation
approach which implies a random walk for consumption. After testing some
assumptions which are vital to both forms of modeling consumption, I im-
plement the results of these tests to form an economic system. This system
is then exposed to shocks of different kinds to illustrate how we would expect
the economy to adjust over time. All estimations have been carried out using
OxMetrics 6 and PcGive version 13.
These findings are then summarized in the conclusion of the thesis in
chapter 5.
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1 Introduction
The last couple of years have been an extraordinary time to study economics.
The profession has come under attack from the public at large for its failure
to predict the financial crisis, while old disagreements and conflicts of theory
have been brought to the fore by competing schools within the profession. It
is quite remarkable that earlier this year Robert Solow, Nobel laureate and
one of the most respected economists alive, testified to the U.S. Congress on
the state of economics as a science1.
The global financial crisis, ushered in by the collapse of the investment
bank Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, highlighted how vulnerable
the globalization of banking has left the world economy. New technology and
financial innovation has made the world smaller, and allowed risky, highly
complex products to be spread across sectors and borders more efficiently
than previously imaginable. We have also witnessed how purely financial
crises can spread to the real economy, and the long-lasting impact this can
have on the unemployment rate.
The ongoing crisis has also revived the debate on the use of fiscal policy
as a means for stabilizing the economy. As the crisis materialized, central
banks across the globe acted swiftly and slashed interest rates to near the
zero lower bound. With rates being so low, monetary policy had very little
traction. To combat falling aggregate demand and increasing unemployment
levels, governments turned to fiscal stimulus packages of unprecedented sizes
to boost demand and in turn stimulate private consumption. This is textbook
Keynesianism. John Maynard Keynes [1935] made the observation that in
serious economic downturns, if the economy is not at full capacity utilization,
the government should intervene to keep effective demand high. This insight
was in stark contrast to the contemporary consensus, where the classical
economists regarded economic downturns, even recessions, as the economy’s
efficient response to an unnaturally high price level. As the years have passed,
the consensus regarding the role of government and fiscal policy has changed
1http://democrats.science.house.gov/Media/file/Commdocs/hearings/2010/
Oversight/20july/Solow_Testimony.pdf
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back and forth and Keynes’s teachings have at times fallen from grace, only
to reappear with slightly altered interpretations of what Keynes had actually
meant.
Though most economists have a pretty clear idea of what Keynesianism
is, far from everyone have ever opened Keynes’s seminal work The General
Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (Keynes [1935]), and fewer still
make it through the entire book. Its influence on the economic profession
has been undeniable, and we often hear politicians across the entire political
spectrum resort to Keynesian logic to explain the intended effects of their
own policies, or why the hopeless policies of their adversaries yielded so poor
results.
It is true that we cannot depend on government alone to create
jobs or long-term growth, but at this particular moment, only
government can provide the short-term boost necessary to lift us
from a recession this deep and severe. Only government can break
the vicious cycles that are crippling our economy - where a lack
of spending leads to lost jobs which leads to even less spending;
where an inability to lend and borrow stops growth, and leads to
even less credit.
— President-elect Barack Obama, Jan 08, 2009
This quote shows President Obama employing Keynesian arguments in
order to explain the need for government deficit spending, and similar argu-
ments were used by his predecessor George W. Bush as he proposed tax cuts
after the IT bubble burst at the beginning of the century.
Although most economists are influenced by Keynes in some way, not all
economists identify themselves with Keynesianism, and not everyone feels
deficit spending is a viable form of fiscal policy. President Obama’s speech
sparked strong reactions from prominent economists, several hundred signing
a petition2 opposing increased government spending. Among these were three
Nobel laureates. Instead, they called for lower tax rates and a smaller public
2http://www.cato.org/special/stimulus09/cato_stimulus.pdf
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sector. Other economists, like John Taylor, have cited Ricardian equivalence
as proof that deficit spending has no effect on even short-term demand. Still
others have pointed to crowding out of private investment, and reduced long-
term growth potential as arguments against large stimulus packages.
Chapter 2 contains a short introduction to the history and development of
macroeconomic theory, and provides some background needed to understand
why there exists no clear consensus among economists regarding the most
effective way to deal with economic slumps.
As the crisis lingers on, many governments find themselves with enormous
deficits, and some nations are in real risk of bankruptcy. (Meanwhile, finan-
cial institutions are again reporting strong quarterly results.) This has led
to increasing demands for fiscal austerity, even in countries still struggling
to recover from recession. Some economists, like Paul Krugman and Joseph
Stiglitz3, have been vocal in opposing this, while others claim reducing bud-
get deficits is not only necessary, but will even enhance short-term economic
growth.
In chapter 3, I go through what I believe are some of the main contributing
factors to the financial crisis. Global trade imbalances and perverse incentives
in the financial sector are central to this discussion. I go on to describe the
different stages of the current crisis, and how it spread from the financial
sector into the real economy. Finally, I devote some time to the various
policy measures taken to combat the crisis. Traditional monetary and fiscal
policy actions were implemented, as well as more experimental policies like
quantitative easing.
In chapter 4 I take a closer look at some of the assumptions made when
constructing macroeconomic models, and see if these assumptions seem rea-
sonable when confronted with data. In particular, I look at a traditional
Keynesian consumption function and the more fashionable Euler equation
approach which implies a random walk for consumption. After testing some
assumptions which are vital to both forms of modeling consumption, I im-
plement the results of these tests to form an economic system. This system
is then exposed to shocks of different kinds to illustrate how we would expect
3http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/stiglitz127/English
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the economy to adjust over time.
These findings are then summarized in the conclusion of the thesis in
chapter 5.
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2 History of Mainstream Macroeconomics
2.1 The Keynesian Revolution
In order to understand why so many skilled economists differ radically in
opinion when it comes to fiscal policy and how to best handle crises and re-
cessions, some familiarity with the history of economic thought is necessary.
In this section I’ve drawn inspiration from the works of N. Gregory Mankiw
[2006], Paul Krugman [1994] and Michael Woodford [2008] on economic his-
tory, notes from Trygve Haavelmo’s lectures (Andvig [1979]), as well as my
own impressions from studying economics for the last five years.
One of the most important challenges in economics, perhaps the most im-
portant, is understanding the business cycle and what causes economic crises.
The events in financial markets during the fall of 2008 quickly spawned skepti-
cism towards the entire economics profession, as its powers of crisis-prediction
left a lot to be desired. There were a few economists who predicted the crisis,
but many of those who got it right have had very poor track records in the
past. That the European Central Bank, and Norges Bank, raised interest
rates as late as the summer of 2008, points to concern that things were going
a little too well, rather than fear of an imminent crisis. How the economics
profession will need to be revised in the aftermath of the crisis remains to
be seen, but it’s unlikely the revision will be as revolutionary as was the
case when John Maynard Keynes published his General Theory shortly af-
ter the Great Depression of the 1930s. Herein, he challenged the classical
economists and their theories. Keynes first-handedly observed markets’ in-
ability to correct and clear, as the classical theories postulated: Following
falling private demand, prices and wages should fall, thus increasing the real
supply of money, and keeping employment around its natural level. This
view was hard to reconcile with unemployment rates around 30% in many
countries, including the US and Norway.
Keynes brought forth the radical insight that economies can, and often
do, suffer from too low aggregate demand, which in turn leads to involuntary
unemployment. At such times, government intervention to remedy the fall in
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private demand may be the most effective way to reduce unemployment. He
proposed several forms of intervention, the most important being that the
monetary authorities should increase the money supply (He even provides
an example of how this can be achieved: If the Treasury were to fill old
bottles with bank notes, bury them at suitable depths in disused coal mines
which are then filled up to the surface with town rubbish, and leave it to
private enterprise on well-trained principles of laissez-faire to dig the notes
up again ... this would be better than nothing.(Keynes [1935])) This action
was taken both during the Great Depression, and during our current crisis,
although slightly more elegant than by filling bottles with bank notes. It
should be noted that expansionary monetary policy was Keynes’s preferred
primary prescription for combatting recessions. However, he also pointed
out that when in a liquidity trap monetary policy loses its traction, and the
government will need to increase its spending to stimulate aggregate demand
both directly through policy measures such as public work programs, and
indirectly through resulting multiplier effects.
Government deficit spending, by borrowing from the private sector, is
what Keynes’s name has become most associated with. Some of these ideas
were implemented by President Roosevelt, but not on a large enough scale
to have but a mitigating effect on the depression. The definite end of the
depression came following World War II, which saw a massive increase in
public spending. This certainly helped reduce unemployment levels, but one
should not infer from this that large scale wars are generally good for the
economy, even though it can be seen as a form of Keynesianism.
The years that followed saw governments enact policies aimed to actively
tune the economy, and it was considered a triumph for Keynesianism when
the Phillips-curve was introduced in the 60s. This apparently straightforward
trade-off between unemployment and inflation implied governments could
choose any unemployment level it desired through Keynesian policies. It
seemed to fit well with the current data, until the stagflation of the 70s
completely broke this relationship down.
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2.2 Milton Friedman and Monetarism
Milton Friedman, of the University of Chicago, was among the first to mount
convincing arguments against Keynesianism. He was the main proponent
of monetarism, advocating a less active role for the government in efforts
to control the business cycle. He argued that recessions are caused by a
reduction in the quantity of money in circulation, and thus the active role of
government could be replaced by mechanical rules for stable, constant growth
in the money supply. Simple, elegant rules like this have clear advantages.
When discretion is necessary, there will always be room for making mistakes.
The monetary authorities can be slow to react to a new recession, since it’s
seldom easy to pinpoint the exact moments in time when the economy enters
a slump. Friedman also observed that monetary policy tends to work with
long and variable lags, adding further uncertainty to the proper conduct of
discretionary policy, and strengthening the case for mechanical rules like a
constant growth in the money supply. A further consequence of Friedman’s
views was that as stable monetary growth would be sufficient to stabilize the
economy, fiscal policy was rendered obsolete. This view of a minimal state
and keeping government meddling in markets to a minimum went down well
in conservative circles. Even though Keynes was by no means a socialist, his
policies seemed to imply a stronger role for government than the right side of
the political spectrum cared for. Their fears were understandable, as there
were plenty of examples of politicians taking Keynes’s message too far, and
ending up doing more harm than good. Excessive use of expansionary fiscal
policy can lead to crowding out of private productive investments. Fiscal
policy is, like monetary policy, also subject to lags, and authorities often
ended up boosting the economy well after a recession had ended.
Friedman’s next move was to predict the failure of the Phillips-curve,
and provide a logical explanation of why one had observed such a smooth
relationship between inflation and unemployment. Friedman [1968] and Ed-
mund S. Phelps claimed that it was unreasonable to assume that nominal
variables could affect real variables in the long run. They showed through the
natural-rate hypothesis that this relationship only held in the short-run, and
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Figure 1: A seemingly smooth relationship broke down in the 70s. (Source:
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis)
was caused by incorrect inflation-expectations on part of workers and firms,
leading to lower unemployment. Friedman claimed people would adjust their
expectations after a while, and as people start expecting a somewhat higher
inflation rate, Friedman’s theory implied the government would have to cre-
ate even higher surprise inflation to keep unemployment at the same level.
What’s more, when expectations of high inflation become anchored among
the public, you’ll end up with persistent inflation and high unemployment.
This is known as stagflation, and it occurred shortly after Friedman had made
his theory public. Having correctly predicted this major economic event gave
further credence to Friedman and the Chicago School of economics. Perhaps
most importantly, Friedman highlighted the importance of expectations in
economics, especially in macroeconomic policy. This paved the way for the
theory of rational expectations.
2.3 Robert Lucas and Rational Expectations
Hailing from the University of Chicago, Robert Lucas expanded upon Fried-
man’s ideas by incorporating the theory of rational expectations into eco-
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nomic modeling. Lucas supported Friedman’s claim that recessions are caused
mainly by people failing to properly understand the current economic situ-
ation, leading to poor decision-making when setting prices or wages. When
a clothing-store observes a drop in demand for their products, it’s initially
difficult to conclude whether this decrease in demand applies to their store
alone. Perhaps their clothes don’t fit the current trends, or perhaps it’s
an economy-wide drop in demand and their competitors are facing the ex-
act same difficulties. This short-term confusion can lead to uncertainty and
sub-optimal actions taken by firms. However, Lucas argued, as soon as the
economic situation is understood, the recession will end as firms and workers
adjust their prices and wages. Furthermore, he argued that monetary policy
could do nothing to speed up this process. Because firms take all available
information into account, and this is the same information that’s available
to the central bank, then firms would be able to predict any logical move by
the central bank and adjust their expectations accordingly, thus rendering
monetary policy useless. This chain-of-thought, although seemingly logically
sound, is a strong hypothesis which one need not accept out of hand. As
many critics have pointed out, it rests on several untested assumptions.
Proponents of rational expectations claim that even though most people
are not economists, they have access to the same information as the central
bank by following the news or reading business papers, where professionals
inform them of the economic situation. The problem with this is illustrated
by the old economics joke that if you put forth a question to five economists,
you’ll get five different answers. Six, if one of them has a PhD. The economic
pundits in the media often don’t even have any background in economics.
Jon Elster has given a coherent criticism of the social sciences from a sim-
ilar perspective, and economics in particular4. He warns against mistaking
aesthetically pleasing models for relevant models. My personal bias aside,
Lucas provided mathematically sound, and dense, arguments for his case.
Mankiw [2006] compares the economists of the Chicago School to scien-
tists. Their models provided a complete system of the economy, with mi-
4http://www.idunn.no/ts/nnt/2007/04/formalisme_pa_tomgang_hard_
obskurantisme
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crofoundations analyzing the individual behavior of economic agents. This
closed a gap that had always been a problem in Keynesian models, and
united the two disciplines in economics; micro and macro. Keynesians are
engineers more than scientists, claims Mankiw. Less concerned with ev-
erything being explained by complex mathematical equations (although by
no means strangers to complex mathematics), Keynesians have always been
more concerned with how the world actually works. If something is observed,
even if there’s no logical foundation for it in economic models, it shouldn’t
be ignored. The ad-hoc Phillips-curve was one example of this, and Robert
Solow’s defense of price and wage rigidities another: I remember reading once
that it is still not understood how the giraffe manages to pump an adequate
blood supply all the way up to its head; but it is hard to imagine that any-
one would therefore conclude that giraffes do not have long necks. — Robert
Solow, 1980 (Mankiw 2006)
Friedman and Lucas’s attacks on Keynesianism were successful, and the
years that followed saw Keynes discredited in many circles. Lucas published
an article with the telling name The Death of Keynesian Economics in 1980,
and two years later Carnegie-Mellon University’s Edward Prescott declared
that his students would never hear Keynes’s name (Krugman [1994]). To-
gether with Finn Kydland he helped develop the real business cycle theory
(Kydland and Prescott [1982]). In this technology-driven model, recessions
merely represent markets’ optimal responses to exogenous shocks, and as
such leaves little room for government short-term tinkering with the econ-
omy. These models, in this simple form, are not taken very seriously by most
economists today. But they paved the way for the use of dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) models in macroeconomic research, and as such
provide the base for The New Keynesian models at work in most central
banks and governments today.
2.4 The New Keynesians and Modern Macro
Early New Keynesian research aimed to show how monetary policy could
be used to stabilize the economy in spite of rational expectations, and tried
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to explain why prices and wages could fail to clear markets. The concept
of efficiency wages was explored: the hypothesis that firms pay employees
above equilibrium wages to increase their efficiency, or productivity.
The more recent New Keynesian research, sometimes called the New
Synthesis (Mankiw [2006]), has sought to combine what was seen as the
strengths of the two major competing views in macro, and in doing so man-
aged to soothe the somewhat unproductive quarreling between academics of
different camps. At the very core of these models one will find a form of a
DSGE RBC-model, providing microfoundations and optimizing agents fac-
ing intertemporal decisions. The RBC-assumptions of frictionless markets
and perfect competition were replaced by nominal rigidities and monopolis-
tic competition. Adding nominal rigidities to this core, such as price and
wage stickiness, allows monetary policy to have a real effect in the short run.
In the long run, classical dichotomy is assumed to hold. Monetary policy
is usually represented by policy rules, such as some form of Taylor-rule, like
this one from Galí [2008]:
it = r
n
t + φpipit + φyy˜t
Here, φpi and φy are non-negative coefficients set by the central bank, deter-
mining how strong the policy response will be to deviations from an inflation-
target or the output gap. Simple Taylor-rules have proven quite accurate in
describing central bank behavior, especially in times of low economic volatil-
ity (Taylor [1993]).
These models also differ between efficient and inefficient economic fluc-
tuations. Real disturbances, like shocks to technology or preferences, merely
cause fluctuations in the economy’s natural level of output. It’s in the pres-
ence of distortions arising from sticky prices and wages that inefficient fluctu-
ations occur, and in such cases economic policy can help to move the economy
closer to its steady state. At the Society for Economic Dynamics in 2010, Ed-
ward Prescott claimed, according to Professor Mark Thoma5, that the high
5http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2010/07/
the-obama-shock-hypothesis-seems-ridiculous.html
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unemployment levels experienced in the US during the current recession are
caused by real disturbances, mainly a fall in labor supply arising from work-
ers anticipating a future increase in taxes. This is an argument against fiscal
stimulus to increase demand, or even the use of monetary policy, during the
current financial crisis. Although controversial among economists, some have
supported this claim of reduced labor supply6, advocating reductions in labor
taxation to increase people’s incentives to work.
More demand-focused economists on the other hand, have responded by
mocking the supply-siders: Was the Great Depression really the Great Vaca-
tion? — Paul Krugman, 2009. The focus on unemployment is interesting,
since it is arguably the single most important economic indicator during re-
cessions. It also represents a weakness in the New Keynesian framework.
Galí’s Monetary policy, inflation and the business cycle [2008], widely-used
at the graduate level as an introduction to the New Keynesian models, is
symptomatic of this as it neglects to consider the social costs of unemploy-
ment, loss of human capital and persistent unemployment. All costs associ-
ated with efficient economic fluctuations are ignored. Limitations as severe
as these have caused some to question whether it is fruitful to continue de-
veloping these DSGE models, or whether they should simply be discarded.
Robert Solow [2010] is among those who are highly critical of the current
framework, stating to a Congressional Committee: When it comes to mat-
ters as important as macroeconomics, a mainstream economist like me insists
that every proposition must pass the small test: does this really make sense? I
do not think the currently popular DSGE models pass the small test. Regard-
ing unemployment, he goes on: The only way that DSGE and related models
can cope with unemployment is to make it somehow voluntary, a choice of
current leisure or a desire to retain some kind of flexibility for the future...
This is exactly the sort of explanation that does not pass the small test.
Despite Solow’s pessimism, it seems likely that future developments in
macroeconomics will revolve around making DSGE models more sophisti-
cated. An obvious criticism after the financial crisis has been the absence of
a financial sector in most modern macroeconomic models, in particular those
6http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/12/24/are-employers-unwilling-to-hire-or-are-workers-unwilling-to-work
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DSGE models used as aid to the conductors of monetary policy. Although
there has been progress in this field, the embedding of a rich banking sector
into models capable of describing the complex behavior of financial markets
is very difficult to accomplish.
In an essay7 on the current state of macroeconomic models, Narayana
Kocherlakota, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, touch
on some of these concerns, and concludes with an interesting note on fiscal
policy: In terms of fiscal policy (especially short-term fiscal policy), mod-
ern macro modeling seems to have had little impact. The discussion about
the fiscal stimulus in January 2009 is highly revealing along these lines. An
argument certainly could be made for the stimulus plan using the logic of
New Keynesian or heterogenous agent models. However, most, if not all, of
the motivation for the fiscal stimulus was based largely on the long-discarded
models of the 1960s and 1970s. This statement seems to indicate that al-
though modern New Keynesian models are in widespread use among aca-
demics, they still need to be refined to reach the same status among policy
makers. Kocherlakota believes that rather than modern models being in-
adequate for analyzing fiscal policy, the problem is a failure among modern
macroeconomists to communicate recent advances in the field to policy mak-
ers.
7http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/pub_display.cfm?id=
4428
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3 The Financial Crisis
3.1 Background
3.1.1 The Great Moderation and a Global Savings Glut
The years preceding the financial crisis were dominated by optimism and
strong economic growth. One observed a reduction in macroeconomic volatil-
ity (Blanchard and Simon [2001]) which led some economists to claim deep
recessions to be a thing of the past. At the American Economic Association in
2003, Robert Lucas famously declared the problem of depression-prevention
to be solved. Claims like these mirrored those made by economists after
the introduction of the Phillips-curve some 40 years earlier. Just as the
stagflation of the 70s put an abrupt stop to the excellence of the Phillips-
curve, it would soon become apparent that the hubris of some economists
was somewhat premature. There may be some cause for concern the next
time economists claim large recessions things of the past.
At the beginning of the millennium, fear of deflation in the US saw the
central bank turn to expansionary monetary policy. This led, in the short-
term, to increased housing prices and increased consumption. A worsening of
the US trade balance ensued, while oil exporting nations like Norway and low-
cost countries like China saw net exports rising fast. A large share of these
surpluses were invested in US government bonds, which kept US interest rates
low for an extended period of time. Fed Governor Ben S. Bernanke referred
to this as a global savings glut8, and went on to argue that the worsening of
the trade deficit in the US could be explained by the behavior of developing
nations. A financial crisis had hit Eastern-Asia in 1997-98, which resulted in
rapid capital outflow and ultimately recession. This prompted the nations
directly affected by the crisis, like Korea and Thailand, to put in place a
safety-net of foreign assets. China did not suffer from the effects of the crisis
as much as other countries in the region, but acknowledged the need to be
prepared for future crises, and followed similar strategies.
8http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2005/200503102/
default.htm
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In 2001 George W. Bush was inaugurated as President, inheriting a solid
budget surplus from President Clinton. Forecasts pointed to a debt-free
nation within the end of the decade. The advantages of this is mainly lower
interest rates, leading to increased investments, and thus, economic growth.
Another important factor is that a solid budget surplus allows the government
to implement expansionary fiscal policy without incurring additional debt,
should the need arise. However, after support from the influential President
of the Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan, large tax cuts were implemented
instead. It was argued that the government surplus was increasing faster
than expected, and as such there would be room for both tax cuts and
debt-reduction. The benefactors of the tax cuts were mainly the wealthier
segments of the population. The tax cuts are scheduled to expire by the end
of 2010, but at this point it seems quite likely they will be extended.
China’s entry on the world market, fueled by cheap and plentiful labor,
made an impact on most industrialized countries’ economies. This repre-
sented a huge positive supply shock with their low-cost export goods, which
helped keep inflation low in the OECD-countries in spite of strong economic
growth. Inflation-targeting central banks kept their policy rates low, which
further escalated asset prices. Even before the outbreak of the financial cri-
sis this focus on inflation-targeting came under criticism, particularly for not
properly taking asset prices into consideration.
3.1.2 Financial Innovation and Misaligned Incentives
Strong growth and low interest rates combined with a deregulation of finan-
cial markets, especially in the United States. President Clinton did more than
oversee an improvement in federal budgets, he also encouraged home own-
ership among the less-creditworthy segment of the population by reforming
the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977. Technological advances increased
access to information and reduced costs of assessing risk, allowing creative
financial institutions to offer mortgage loans to high-risk individuals with
imperfect credit, so called subprime mortgages.
Known as ARMs, Adjustable Rate Mortgages, these loans came with
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special clauses like interest-only payments for an extended period of time,
or with an initial fixed interest rate, usually very low, which would adjust
upwards after a few years. Lenders seldom held on to the mortgages until they
were repaid, but instead sold the mortgages on to financial intermediaries,
like investment banks. The banks would then pool bundles of mortgages
together with other assets, for instance credit card debt and auto loans to
diversify the risk, creating Asset-Backed Securities (ABS) through a process
known as securitization. This enabled the banks to sell these products on to
investors.
One particular form of ABS has been the subject of much discussion after
the financial bubble burst in 2008, namely Collateralized Debt Obligations
(CDOs). CDOs consist of portfolios of underlying assets which are split into
different classes according to risk, time to maturity, liquidity etc. Credit
agencies then assign different ratings to the products, where an AAA-rating
typically is the highest rating attainable. The credit agencies also made
profits from consulting investment banks on how to construct CDOs so as to
just meet the minimum requirements for AAA-ratings. With a weaker rating
came a higher interest rate paid out to investors, but also a higher risk of
default.
The emergence of Credit Default Swaps (CDS) allowed for insurance
against default. Such insurance allows bond holders to hedge the risk: In
case of default, the seller of the CDS would pay the par value of the bond
(the initial value of the bond, or the value at the time of maturity) and
receive the bond from the buyer. In exchange, the buyer makes quarterly
payments similar to an interest rate to the CDS-seller. The market for CDS
evolved further, and so-called naked credit default swaps allowed buyers and
sellers to speculate on the default-risk of bonds without either party owning
the underlying bonds themselves.
The benefits of deregulation included increased access to capital for bor-
rowers, and lower transaction costs for investors. New financial products al-
lowed for greater diversification, and made it possible to tailor-make products
according to investor’s different tastes for risk. In his paper Has Financial
Development Made the World Riskier from 2005, Raghuram G. Rajan argues
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that investors and investment managers face a misalignment of incentives,
ultimately leading to too high risk-taking among managers. Managers are
typically compensated according to the return they generate for investors.
Since managers can usually increase short-term returns simply by taking on
more risk, an effective and easy way of monitoring them can be to evaluate
their performance relative to a common benchmark. The S&P500 is often
used for this purpose.
Such monitoring is not without its problems, however. When evaluated
relative to one’s peers, incentives of herding are created. Investing in sim-
ilar or identical products as the competition provides an insurance against
underperforming relatively to them. Such behavior can lead to prices failing
to convey the proper value of a certain stock, for instance, if managers are
investing in the stock simply because their competition is doing the same.
Rajan [2005] claims that due to herd behavior stocks can deviate from their
fundamental value for a prolonged period of time. This just reinforces the
herding, as even a manager who believes a stock is underpriced and considers
going against the trend has no guarantee the underpriced stock will adjust
back to a fundamentally correct level in the short-run.
Another factor leading to perverse incentives and too high risk taking
is the bonus systems affecting the salaries of investment managers. In the
event of strong returns, large bonuses are often paid out to managers. These
bonuses are not off-set by equivalent decreases in salary when a manager
performs poorly. This system encourages managers to take on risk, as this
increases the possibility of reaping the rewards as risky investments pay off,
while the losses are borne mainly by investors. This is especially true for
managers of smaller funds looking to attract investors, and young managers
out to make a name for themselves, as they have even stronger incentives to
gamble with high risk investments to prove to potential investors they can
produce greater returns than their more established competition. Combined
with herding, this has lead to managers investing in risky assets that are not
included in their benchmark, and thus hidden from traditional monitoring.
Finally, low interest rates and search for yield meant many financial firms
were highly leveraged. Even though focus is often on the US financial sector
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alone when analyzing the causes of the financial crisis, the globalization of
banking saw firms in European countries replicate the behavior of the finan-
cial institutions across the Atlantic. A McKinsey report9 shows increases in
debt and leveraging was a global event, and not confined to the US. They
also find that much of the growth in debt and leverage took place in the
real economy, in housing in particular. Even so, the high degree of leverage
in certain financial institutions would eventually cause problems beyond the
financial sector.
3.2 Collapse of the Housing Market, Trouble for Banks
3.2.1 The Subprime Mortgage Crisis
The increase in available credit to persons who would normally not be consid-
ered creditworthy allowed many more to afford homeownership, and a trend
of increasing housing prices combined with initial low interest rates from
ARMs meant most subprime borrowers were able to meet downpayments on
their loans. But as the steady increase in housing prices reached its peak in
2006 and subsequently started to drop, it became more difficult for borrowers
to refinance out of the ARMs to more favorable mortgages.
The federal funds rate had increased from very low levels (Figure 2), and
as the interest rates on ARMs adjusted to reflect this, default rates on sub-
prime loans quickly increased. As an isolated event, homeowners defaulting
on their loans is bad news for the banks. Even more so when the defaults are
a direct consequence of a decline in the value of the house. However, since
the subprime loans were also integrated into so many new financial products
like Asset-Backed Securities, the value of these securities now plummeted,
multiplying the effects of loan-defaults.
In the summer of 2007, rating agencies Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s
downgraded the ratings of over 100 bonds backed by subprime mortgages,
and shortly after announced many more were likely to follow. The investment
bank Bear Stearns filed bankruptcy for two hedgefunds that were heavily
9http://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/reports/freepass_pdfs/debt_and_
deleveraging/debt_and_deleveraging_full_report.pdf
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Figure 2: The Federal Funds Target Rate 2002(1)-2007(3) (Source: Federal
Reserve Bank of New York)
involved in Mortgaged-Backed Securities.
3.2.2 Uncertainty Leads to Collapsed Credit Markets
At this time, as they hadn’t been subject to normal regulation, no-one were
certain of how widespread these securities were, and which banks were most
exposed to losses. This uncertainty manifested itself in increased stock mar-
ket volatility, CDS rates sharply increasing, and soaring interbank rates.
The interbank rates are the interest rates banks charge for short-term loans
to other banks, often represented by a reference rate like the LIBOR. In
normal times the interbank rates follow the federal funds rate very closely,
usually being only marginally above it. However, when banks are uncertain
of the solvency of other banks, they cannot know whether a loan will be re-
paid. Banks are also likely to increase their own share of liquid assets during
crises, both because of short-term uncertainty and the possibility of bank
runs. This is exactly what happened during the crisis. The supply of loans
decreased, leading to a credit crunch. As firms and consumers were unable
to borrow, the lack of credit affected aggregate demand through decreased
investment and consumption. This is one of the channels through which the
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crisis spread from the financial sector to the real economy. During the fall
of 2007, the Federal Reserve responded to the contraction in supply of credit
by announcing it would provide reserves through open market operations to
reduce the gap between the Fed’s target rate and the interbank rate10.
Bear Stearns had previously showed signs of trouble, and the uncertainty
surrounding their solvency manifested itself in March 2008, when the invest-
ment bank was unable to acquire short-term loans from other banks. They
came to an agreement with the Federal Reserve over a very short-term loan
in the size of $25 billion. This agreement was subsequently changed to a
$30 billion loan to the competing investment bank JP Morgan Chase with
collateral consisting of Bear Stearns assets, which JP Morgan Chase would
use to purchase Bear Stearns. The Fed provided this loan out of fear for the
repercussions of the demise of an investment bank as large as Bear Sterns. It
seemed to work, and signs of an imminent crisis appeared to weaken. Speak-
ing at a bankers’ conference, Fed President Ben Bernanke announced: The
risk that the economy has entered a substantial downturn appears to have
diminished. He went on to worry about the upwards pressure on inflation.
10http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20070810a.htm
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3.2.3 Lehman Brothers’ Failure
Lehman Brothers, like Bear Stearns, were among the largest investment
banks in the world. They were also involved in similar products, and Lehman
suffered substantial losses on mortgage-backed securities. The Federal Re-
serve were negotiating a similar deal as they had previously done with Bear
Stearns and JP Morgan Chase, with the British bank Barclay’s interested
in purchasing Lehman. Lehman Brothers was by many considered too big
to fail, so it seemed natural that the Fed would facilitate its rescue, as they
had with Bear Stearns. However, the deal fell through. On September 15,
Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy, the largest US firm ever to do so.
Widespread panic in the stock markets ensued. The fears were the same as
they had been over the past year: No-one knew exactly which banks Lehman
Brothers owed money, and when an institution as large as Lehman could
collapse, then it seemed anyone else could too. Lehman Brothers shares lost
over 90% of their value the same day, and the Dow Jones dropped 500 points.
The interbank rates had been more volatile than usual for some time, but
now the credit markets completely broke down.
The Federal Reserve had received criticism for the rescue of Bear Stearns
earlier the same year. Critics feared the government signalling to banks
that they would save them should they run into trouble would create moral
hazard problems that would just worsen the kind of behavior which had
contributed to the crisis. However, after the bankruptcy of Lehman, the
Federal Reserve deemed the risk of the crisis spreading further to the real
economy was of greater importance than future moral hazard problems. The
very next day it provided an emergency loan to the insurance company AIG.
Still, with banks cutting back on their lending and increasing interest rates
on corporate bonds, it was only a matter of time before investment and
consumption proceeded to fall and send the economy into recession. The
reduction in consumption and investment would in turn reduce the profits
of firms, making banks even less willing to provide loans. The effects of
the collapsed credit markets and the fall in aggregate demand were thus
reinforcing each other. It was time for government action.
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3.3 Policy Response: The Central Banks
3.3.1 The Federal Funds Rate
As we have seen the Federal Reserve acted as a lender of last resort on several
occasions during the crisis. This is but one of the tools in the Fed’s tool box.
The Federal Reserve’s principal tool for conducting monetary policy is setting
the federal funds rate through open market operations. This is the interest
rate at which depository institutions lend balances at the Federal Reserve to
other depository institutions overnight11. The Fed controls the short-term
interest rate by buying and selling bonds in the bonds market, thus adjusting
the money supply to achieve the target rate. The target rate is set by the
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), which consists of five presidents
of the Federal Reserve Banks, of which the president of the New York branch
is the only constant, and also the members of the Federal Reserve’s Board
of Governors. The open market operations are then carried out by the New
York branch.
On September 18 the Fed started to reduce its target rate, from 5.25
percent to 4.75. Subsequent reductions followed shortly.
Table 1: Federal Funds Target Rate, Changes
Date Target Rate (Percent)
September 17, 2007 5.25
September 18, 2007 4.75
October 31, 2007 4.50
December 11, 2007 4.25
January 22, 2008 3.50
January 30, 2008 3.00
March 18, 2008 2.25
April 30, 2008 2.00
October 10, 2008 1.50
October 29, 2008 1.00
December 16, 2008 0 - 0.25
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
We see from Table 1 that the federal funds rate approached the zero lower
11http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/openmarket.htm
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bound. Effective of December 16, 2008, the Fed reports the target interest
rate as a range. The range was at that date set from 0 to 0.25%, where it
still remains.
Lower interest rates stimulate the economy in the short run with its pos-
itive effects on investment. When at the zero lower bound, the central bank
is unable to use conventional monetary policy to stimulate the economy as
much as it might like. Combined with aggregate demand being below the
production capacity of the economy, this state can be referred to as a liq-
uidity trap. As the interest rate declines, the demand for money increases,
and the demand for bonds decreases. At the zero lower bound, consumers
become indifferent between holding money or bonds: The demand for money
becomes horizontal. This is illustrated in Figure 4, where point A shows the
market clearing interest rate under normal circumstances. If the money sup-
ply is increased to point B, the interest rate is at the zero lower bound, and
the demand for money becomes horizontal. Beyond this point, an increase
in the money supply will not reduce the interest rate. This is the kind of
situation the US finds itself in during the crisis, and the same is true for the
EMU-area.
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Though the central bank affects the short-term nominal interest rates
through its actions, it’s the real interest rate that matters for firms and
consumers. So even though one would think a very low nominal interest rate
would be sufficient to boost the economy in most situations, this need not
apply during long-lasting recessions. The reason for this is lower inflation,
and lower inflation expectations, ultimately leading to deflation. As has been
the case in Japan over the last decades, inflation rates in the US and the EU
have declined steadily as the crisis has lingered on, and we’ve seen the first
cases of actual deflation. The problem with deflation is illustrated by its
effect on the real interest rate, here represented by the Fisher Equation:
r = i− pi
Currently we are in a situation with very low, almost zero, nominal inter-
est rates, as well as very low, almost negative, inflation. From the equation
above we see that deflation increases the real interest rate. Meanwhile the
nominal interest rate is stuck at zero. Increased real interest rates reduces
investment and consumption, which reduces output, in turn leading to even
more deflation and worsening the recession. Olivier Blanchard et al. [2010]
proposed to increase the inflation targets set by central banks (which are usu-
ally quite low, often close to 2 percent) in order to allow for higher nominal
interest rates, which would then make it possible to cut nominal interest rates
more without hitting the zero lower bound so quickly, and to help minimize
the risk of deflation.
In a liquidity trap, as conventional monetary policy has little traction, it
seems natural to turn to fiscal policy in order to stimulate the economy. This
is also what happened during the crisis, but the fiscal expansion was not only
conducted through traditional fiscal stimulus, but also by central banks.
3.3.2 Quantitative Easing
Unable to influence short-term interest rates by further expansion of the
money supply, and with credit markets still not functioning normally, the
central banks of the US, UK and the European Central Bank have all en-
24
gaged in quantitative easing (QE), an expansion of the central banks’ bal-
ance sheets. A term used quite broadly, QE implies increasing the quantity
of money by injecting funds directly into the economy. This usually entails
"printing money" and using it to purchase not only safe government bonds,
but risky private sector assets like mortgage-backed securities.
Both the Fed and the ECB have avoided using the term quantitative
easing, possibly because it has become associated with failed attempts by
the Bank of Japan to combat deflation, but most likely because they felt the
term didn’t fit their particular policies. Fed Governor Bernanke has instead
used the term credit easing to describe the Fed’s policies. Qualitative easing
might be just as fitting: the Federal Reserve’s credit easing approach focuses
on the mix of loans and securities that it holds and on how this composition
of assets affect credit conditions for households and businesses.12 The aim
of such policies has been to improve the functioning of credit markets, bring
down long-term interest rates and increase the supply of credit to borrowers,
as well as decrease the risk of deflation. By transferring newly created money
to other banks’ balance sheets in return for assets, the central banks hope to
induce increased lending through money multiplier effects. Additionally, as
a large share of the assets purchased are often government bonds, this large
increase in demand pushes the price of government bonds up, thus reducing
bond yields. Reduced returns on government bonds makes banks less likely
to invest their new money in such bonds, and instead look for investments
with higher return, like lending money to firms and households.
Criticism of quantitative easing includes the fact that central banks are
taking on risk on behalf of taxpayers. There’s no guarantee the central bank
will receive a similar price on its assets when it decides it’s time to pull some of
the money out of the market again, when the economy is recovering. In fact,
it might even be likely to take a loss on such transactions. Buying government
bonds at a time of crisis, when interest rates are low, and selling the low-
interest bonds on the market again when the economy is in better shape
and market interest rates are presumably higher may well expose the central
banks to some losses. Losses which will have to be covered by government
12http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090218a.htm
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deficit spending. In this manner, the central bank can be said to conduct
fiscal policy, and it can do so without going through the ordinary democratic
channels of fiscal policy, for better or worse.
Whenever there’s talk of central banks printing money, some critics voice
concerns over possible hyperinflation. Some inflation is indeed a desired
result of QE as it reduces the real interest rate, but central banks must take
care to get their timing right when extracting the extra money out of the
recovering economy. Even so, the majority of mainstream economists support
the unconventional measures taken by the Fed during the crisis.
Finally, it’s still uncertain how effective the Fed’s asset purchases will
prove to be. Blinder and Zandi [2010] find the combined efforts to stabilize
the financial sector highly effective. Goldman Sachs’s Jan Hatzius13, while
discussing whether the Fed would engage in further easing, is concerned the
scale of asset purchases needed to have any real effect is so large it will
be hampered by monetary policymakers’ natural bias towards caution: So
usually what happens is that you’re in a liquidity trap and you’re at the zero
bound and you send the staffers away to try and figure out the optimal policy.
They go away and model things and come back with some monstrously large
number of the amount that needs to be purchased, and the policymakers say,
’Well, I’m not sure you’ve properly taken into account all the tail risks of
this? How do you account for the tail risk that people will lose confidence?’
So then the policymakers take a step back towards caution, and that’s why in
this kind of situation, stimulus tends to be underprovided compared to what’s
necessary. I think we’ll do quite a lot, but it will still fall short of what we
need.
3.4 Policy Response: Fiscal Stimulus
3.4.1 The Economic Stimulus Act of 2008
The first round of fiscal stimulus during the financial crisis was passed by
the US Congress as early as February 2008, several months prior to the fall
13http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/2010/10/will_america_come_
to_envy_japa.html
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of Lehman Brothers. The stimulus, with an estimated cost of $170 billion,
consisted mainly of tax rebates to low- and middle-income taxpayers, which
lawmakers hoped would boost consumer and business spending. The increase
in disposable income is clearly visible in Figure 5, but there does not seem
to be a corresponding jump in consumption.
Taylor [2008] has been among the critics of this stimulus, claiming the tax
rebates did not result in any statistically significant increases in consump-
tion. He points out that this result was not unexpected, as it is consistent
with the permanent-income hypothesis of consumption developed by Milton
Friedman. According to this theory, consumers take not only present dispos-
able income into account when determining their consumption, but also their
expectations of future disposable income. The implication is that transitory
income, like the one-time tax rebates of the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008,
should have little impact on present consumption. This is closely related to
Ricardian Equivalence: Consumers expect higher future taxes will be needed
to cover the deficit created by the stimulus.
However, the permanent-income hypothesis assumes that consumers can
borrow money in order to smooth their consumption. In reality, consumers
might be liquidity constrained, which would cause present consumption to
be below the desired level when optimizing according to a life-time budget.
In this case, even transitory income would increase consumption. Professors
Broda and Parker [2008] are among those who disagree with John B. Taylor,
and find significant increases in consumer spending after the tax rebates.
Blinder and Zandi [2010] attributes the failure of consumption spending to
immediately follow the increase in disposable income to the fact that it was
the low- to middle-income taxpayers who received the rebates, whereas it was
mainly the higher income segment of the population who at the time were
affected by sharply falling asset prices, leading them to increase their saving
and decrease consumption.
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Figure 5: The tax rebates increased disposable income. (Source: U.S. De-
partment of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis)
3.4.2 The Troubled Asset Relief Program
In October 2008, with the world’s financial system collapsing, the Troubled
Asset Relief Program (TARP) was signed into law. The program allowed the
US Treasury to purchase up to $700 billion worth of "troubled assets", like
CDOs, from struggling financial institutions. Although the initial intention
was for the program to allow for purchases of illiquid assets, the treasury used
most of the money to inject equity into the investment banks by acquiring
shares in the financial institutions who struggled. It was an attempt to restore
stability to the system, and to complement the actions taken by the Federal
Reserve. This made the US government a major shareholder in some of the
largest financial institutions in the world, in effect partially nationalizing
them.
The effects of TARP are still widely discussed. The program has received
a lot of criticism, not only because many US citizens oppose nationalization of
companies, but also because it went against a lot of taxpayers sense of justice
that their money should be spent saving the same financial institutions that
many held responsible for the crisis. However, the interbank interest rates fell
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rapidly after the intention to inject equity was announced. Blinder and Zandi
[2010] find TARP to be a substantial success, helping to restore stability to
the financial sector. They also find the likely cost of TARP to be less than
$100 billion, and the equity injection component of the program likely to be
profitable for the government.
3.4.3 The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
The next round of fiscal stimulus was more conventional, but ironically has
been the perhaps most controversial of all policy responses taken during
the crisis. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA)
passed through Congress in February 2009. The package, $787 billion or
about 5% of GDP in size, was composed of increased government spending
and tax cuts, with focus primarily on the former. It contained an expansion
and extension of unemployment benefits, cash payments similar to those of
the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, as well as health care subsidies and
investment in education and infrastructure.
The reasoning behind the stimulus was that although the other policy
measures taken by the Fed and the Treasury had helped stabilize the financial
sector, the large decline in aggregate demand would eventually lead to a
prolonged economic decline. Christina D. Romer, the Chair of the Council of
Economic Advisers, was instrumental in designing the stimulus package. Due
to the already substantial budget deficit in the US, the President demanded
the package be designed to provide only useful spending, spending in areas
where there was concrete needs. In Romer [2009] she concludes that the
stimulus provided a crucial lift to aggregate demand.
Prior to the stimulus being passed by Congress, its usefulness was hotly
debated among economists. Broadly speaking, Democrats and the more
Keynesian economists tended to support the stimulus, while Republicans and
the supply-side economists tended to oppose it14. Being at the beginning of
14There were plenty of exceptions to this generalization, of course. Most economists
probably believe some form of deficit spending can be useful, while accepting there are
many limitations to fiscal policy in general. The same applies to Democrats and Republi-
cans, although no Republicans in the House of Representatives, and only three Republican
Senators voted in favor of the ARRA.
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a recession which looked to be long-lasting, while up against the zero lower
bound in a liquidity trap, seemed like ideal conditions for fiscal stimulus to
be effective. However, others worried about the already large budget deficit
and the general impact (or lack thereof) of increased government spending.
So who turned out to be right? It is tempting to suggest that the answer
to that question depends entirely on what kind of economic model you believe
best describes reality. The data by itself does not seem to give any unam-
biguous conclusions. Those who claimed the stimulus would not work, like
Taylor [2008], claim the data shows they got their predictions right. Those
who were in favor of fiscal stimulus, like Krugman and Stiglitz [2008], claim
the data shows the stimulus package prevented the economy from plunging
into a depression, but that the stimulus was too small to fill the output gap,
and that additional stimulus is needed. Indeed, Christina D. Romer report-
edly found the stimulus needed to fill the output gap was in the range of
$1.2 trillion. Why the proposed stimulus was substantially smaller is not
known. It may have been politically difficult or impossible to pass a package
of that size. Another reason might be that it was never the intention of
the Obama administration to fill the output gap. In an article in the New
Yorker15, Ryan Lizza describes a memo regarding the stimulus presented to
President Obama: Summers did not include Romer’s $1.2-trillion projection.
The memo argued that the stimulus should not be used to fill the entire output
gap; rather, it was "an insurance package against catastrophic failure." At
the meeting, according to one participant, "there was no serious discussion
to going above a trillion dollars.
The political reality today, with the stimulus regarded mainly as a fail-
ure by the general public, makes the additional fiscal stimulus proposed by
Stiglitz and others appear unrealistic. Instead there are demands for in-
creased fiscal austerity to combat the mounting budget deficit. Similar de-
mands in Europe has led to several European governments tightening their
fiscal policies, even with unemployment rates high above 10% and the econ-
omy showing no strong signs of recovering. Jean-Claude Trichet, President
15http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/10/12/091012fa_fact_lizza?
printable=true
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of the European Central Bank (ECB) has claimed that fiscal austerity will
boost the economy in the short run, because it will improve consumer confi-
dence. This contradicts the traditional Keynesian view that fiscal austerity
will weaken economic growth in the short run. It also seems somewhat un-
likely that the main concern of a person who’s living in a country with mass
unemployment, or is unemployed himself, is the long-term budget balance. It
seems more likely that his concerns and uncertainty revolve around the short-
term, day-to-day situation, and as such large budget cuts would only add to
that uncertainty. Indeed, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reached
the opposite conclusion as the ECB did in its World Economic Outlook16
from October 2010. This highlights the contradicting messages conveyed by
powerful economic institutions, and the uncertainty and lack of consensus
regarding fundamental macroeconomics.
16http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/02/pdf/text.pdf
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4 Consumption Functions
As I pointed out in the previous section, the conclusions one reach when
looking at data are easily influenced by which parts of economic theory one
holds the most trust in. The confirmation bias is a powerful factor here, as
is the framework of economic models chosen to analyze a particular problem.
In this section I will look more closely at some of the assumptions made
by particular influential models, and see how those assumptions fare when
confronted with data. In particular, I will focus on the determinants of con-
sumption and how an Euler equation approach differs from a more Keynesian
view.
There are two major macroeconomic modeling traditions which can be
said to have an impact when it comes to policy making:
• The large scale macroeconometric models which dominated economic
modeling completely until the Lucas critique (Lucas [1976]). These
Keynesian models emphasize estimating the relationship between eco-
nomic variables based on past correlation in the data.
• The Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium models with microfoun-
dations, which by including consumers maximizing utility given budget
constraints, profit maximizing firms, and other microeconomic aspects
of the economy are able to avoid the problems pointed out in the Lucas
critique. RBC models and New Keynesian models fit into this category.
4.1 Traditional Consumption Functions and Euler Equa-
tions
Central to economic models intended to guide policy analysis is the behavior
of consumers. Consumption is the single largest component of GDP. The
strong correlation between income and consumption is well documented, and
the relationship between these two form the basis for consumption functions.
The traditional Keynesian consumption function holds that consumption
is determined mainly by current disposable income, meaning there is a causal
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relationship from income to consumption. This can be expanded to include
broader measures of wealth. In Moody’s Macroeconomic Model for instance,
they use real household cash-flow : The sum of personal disposable income,
capital gain realizations on the sale of financial assets, and net new borrow-
ing. Additionally, they also include housing and financial wealth in their
consumption functions. (Zandi and Pozsar [2006])
As was evident from Figure 5, there are other factors influencing con-
sumption than just disposable income. Milton Friedman’s permanent-income
hypothesis is consistent with fluctuations in current disposable income not
manifesting itself in increased consumption. He proposed that it is perma-
nent, not current, income which is the main determinant of consumption. It
follows that an increase in disposable income only increases consumption to
the extent that it is permanent income which has increased, and not transi-
tory income. To illustrate this we can assume utility functions and notation
similar to those found in Romer [2006], to show how a consumer is assumed
to maximize under uncertainty:
E[U ] = E[
T∑
t=1
(Ct − a
2
C2t )], a > 0
subject to the budget constraint:
T∑
t=1
Ct ≤ A0 +
T∑
t=1
Yt
where A0 is initial wealth.
The Euler equation approach is used to describe how individuals make
intertemporal choices regarding consumption. We see from the above that
the marginal utility of consumption in period t is 1 − aCt. So if present
consumption C1 is decreased by dC in order to increase future consumption
by an equal amount, the utility cost of this is (1 − aC1)dC. The expected
utility benefit of increased future consumption is E1[1 − aCt]dC. For an
optimizing consumer, we will have:
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1− aC1 = E1[1− aCt]
It follows from this, that:
C1 = E1[Ct]
From this we see that the period-1 expectation of consumption in period
2, equals period-1 consumption. So for every period, we expect the next
period’s consumption to be equal to current consumption. An implication of
this is that changes in consumption are unpredictable. This is the conclusion
in the famous paper Stochastic Implications of the Life Cycle-Permanent
Income Hypothesis: Theory and Evidence by Robert E. Hall [1978]. In this
paper Hall shows that consumption follows a random walk with a trend, a
martingale. The consequence of this hypothesis is as previously mentioned
that economic policy affects consumption only to the extent that it affects
permanent income.
4.2 Data
All of the data used in this section was obtained from Federal Reserve Eco-
nomic Data17, a database of US economic time series available online from
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Unless specified otherwise, the data
is of monthly frequency and seasonally adjusted. My data set covers the
period 1959(1)-2010(8).
Consumption and disposable income are two variables which we know
tend to increase over time, so estimates from a regression on these non-
stationary variables can be spurious. We would also expect the logs of these
variables to be non-stationary. A variable xt can be said to be stationary
when its mean value and variance are constant and independent of t, E[xt] =
µ, V ar[xt] = σ2. Time series data which can be shown to be integrated
of order one, or I(1), can be made stationary and I(0) by taking the first
differences of the logs. We can use unit root tests to verify whether we need
17http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/
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Figure 6: Log, and first differences of the log, of disposable income and
consumption.
to take differences to solve for non-stationarity.
Table 2: Unit Root Tests
Variable Level First difference
log Income -1.75 -29.20***
log Income, test with trend -2.22 -29.30***
log Consumption -1.25 -29.37***
log Consumption, test with trend -1.24 -29.51***
Note: *** significant at 1% critical level.
We apply the augmented Dickey-Fuller test with three lags to test the
null hypothesis of a unit root, and in the case of log of income y and log of
consumption c, find that we fail to reject the presence of a unit root. This
indicates that the data needs to be differenced to be made stationary. As we
would expect, when testing the first differences we can reject unit roots at
the 1% significance level. Including modifications for time trends does not
alter the conclusions of the tests.
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4.3 The Model
Given the results of the unit root tests, we use the first difference of the
logs of income and consumption to solve for non-stationarity. Let y be log
of income, and c be log of consumption. The statistical model for the two
variables can be written as
∆yt = αy1∆yt−1 + αy2∆ct−1 + αyecm(yt−1 − βct−1 − s∗) + εyt (1)
∆ct = αc1∆yt−1 + αc2∆ct−1 + αcecm(yt−1 − βct−1 − s∗) + εct (2)
It is important for the relevance of this model that yt−1 − ct−1 − s∗ is
a so called stationary series, which means that we can interpret s∗ as an
equilibrium value. Even though yt and ct are individually integrated of order
one, I(1), it is possible that for some β 6= 0 yt − βct is a stationary process
I(0). If this β exists, we say that yt and ct are cointegrated, and there exists
an error correction term which should be included in the model. The error
correction term moves the independent variable towards the long run value
following lagged deviations from equilibrium. Note that we do not need
to “see” s∗ in the estimation, since it is subsumed in the intercept in the
estimated dynamic equations. In Figure 7 we can clearly see how the savings
rate has increased sharply in response to the financial crisis.
We can test the stationary assumption of the savings rate st = yt − ct by
conducting an augmented Dickey-Fuller test.
Table 3: Unit Root Tests
Variable Level
Savings rate, st = yt − ct -4.04***
lag 1 -3.20**
lag 2 -2.71
Test with trend -5.26***
lag 1 -4.21***
lag 2 -3.62**
Note: ***, ** significant at 1%, 5% critical level.
The cointegration of consumption and income is consistent with both the
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Figure 7: yt − ct, The approximate savings rate.
traditional macroeconometric consumption functions, and the permanent-
income hypothesis. However, according to the permanent-income hypoth-
esis, the error correction does not take place by consumption adjusting to
the lagged difference between consumption and income. Rather, the correc-
tion comes through adjustment of disposable income (Deaton [1992]). The
intuition behind this is that low current consumption relative to disposable
income is a sign that the consumer expects income to decline in the future,
and is therefore increasing his current saving in preparation to this decline.
This is sometimes referred to as the saving for a rainy day hypothesis. If
this is true, then αcecm = 0 in the model. Given cointegration, then αyecm
must be 6= 0.
The traditional consumption functions take an opposing view to the
causality between consumption and income. They assume that the causality
goes the other way: Increases in income is followed by increases in con-
sumption, and it is consumption which error-corrects. That corresponds to
0 < αcecm < 1 in our model. Clearly, in the Keynesian interpretation two-way
causation (error correction in both income and consumption) is a possibility.
Indeed, if that is the case then the error correction taking place in y might
be seen as a result of "demand determined" GDP.
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A main point however, is that according to the Keynesian interpretation
we should have error correction in consumption as a more general and time-
invariant mechanism. In particular, that mechanism should hold even in
instances where αyecm = 0 as a result of eg. full capacity utilization or very
high import leakage. The Euler equation / permanent-income interpretation
of the cointegration does not allow for such contingencies. The reason is
that according to this interpretation consumption is always and everywhere
a random walk (αcecm = 0), and therefore there is no way to explain the
savings rate being I(0) without αyecm 6= 0.
So, for the dynamic system (1)-(2) to be logically consistent with sta-
tionarity of st, then either αyecm 6= 0, or αcecm 6= 0, or both. We can test
these hypotheses. We estimate by OLS and use Autometrics in PcGive on
the empirical counterparts of (1)-(2), allowing for outlier detection. We ini-
tially include 12 lags of ∆ct and ∆yt in the general unrestricted models
(GUM), and let Autometrics filter out the insignificant lags. Autometrics
found 15 impulse dummies for the income equation, including two dummies
that correspond to the tax rebates given during the financial crisis. In the
consumption equation 21 dummies are included, mainly from the 70s and
80s. The quite large number of dummies is not very surprising considering
the use of monthly data. The dummy coefficients are not reported in the
estimated equations 3 and 4 below.
∆̂yt = 0.001647
(0.00079)
− 0.1165
(0.026)
∆yt−2 − 0.1038
(0.0258)
∆yt−3 + 0.08513
(0.0346)
∆ct−2
+ 0.1414
(0.0355)
∆ct−3 + 0.06917
(0.0331)
∆ct−8 + 0.1145
(0.0332)
∆ct−11
+ 0.09373
(0.0329)
∆ct−12 − 0.005808
(0.00724)
ECMt−1
(3)
The values in parentheses are the standard errors, so the t-value of αyecm
is −0.802, which means we do not reject αyecm = 0. The reason for this might
be that our simple model omits important factors for explaining disposable
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Table 4: Diagnostics for the Income Equation
σ = 0.0044, 607 observations
AR 1-7 test: F(7,576) = 0.87951 [0.5223]
ARCH 1-7 test: F(7,593) = 3.7038 [0.0006]**
Normality test: χ2(2) = 55.148 [0.0000]**
Hetero test: F(26,570) = 1.2635 [0.1738]
RESET23 test: F(2,581) = 2.6427 [0.0720]
income.
The first line of the diagnostics in Table 4 refers to a test for autocor-
relation, AR 1-7. It tests the null hypothesis of absence of autocorrelation.
We reject this null hypothesis if the observed value is high compared to the
reported p-value. In this case, the observed value of 0.87951 compared to
a p-value of 0.5223. This leads us to keep the hypothesis of no autocorre-
lation. The next line is an AutoRegressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity
test of order 7, proposed by Engle [1982]. The Jarque-Bera test (Jarque and
Bera [1980]) for normality tests whether the residuals’ skewness and kurtosis
(fat tails) correspond to a normal distribution. Next follows the White-test
(White [1980]) for constant variance of the error terms. We reject the null
hypothesis of homoscedastic error terms if the observed value, here 1.2635,
is high compared to the p-value of 0.1738. In our case we do not reject the
null. The final test is the Regression Specification Test (RESET). As the
name implies, this tests for functional form misspecification, and it does so
by adding non-linear functions of the independent variable to an alternative
model to see if this better fits the data. The null hypothesis is that our
current specification is correct, and if the F-test gives us a high observed
value compared to the p-value, we reject the null. In our case we keep the
hypothesis that we’ve used a correct specification.
We observe that two null hypotheses are rejected: The ARCH test and the
normality test. This is probably related to the fact that the use of monthly
data with quite high volatility leaves us with some outliers not taken care of
by dummies. These outliers could cause heteroscedasticity, as well as lead to
issues with normality. However, the most important test for us to be able
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to regard the estimators as consistent is the autocorrelation test. And as we
see from Table 4, we do not reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation.
∆̂ct = − 0.00132
(0.000765)
− 0.1864
(0.0336)
∆ct−1 + 0.05182
(0.0322)
∆ct−5 + 0.1694
(0.0331)
∆ct−6
+ 0.1544
(0.0335)
∆ct−7 + 0.1898
(0.0334)
∆ct−8 + 0.09486
(0.0331)
∆ct−9
+ 0.07281
(0.0321)
∆ct−11 + 0.05009
(0.0247)
∆yt−1 − 0.05018
(0.0245)
∆yt−9
+ 0.02181
(0.007)
ECMt−1
(4)
Table 5: Diagnostics for the Consumption Function
σ = 0.0042, 607 observations
AR 1-7 test: F(7,568) = 0.72305 [0.6525]
ARCH 1-7 test: F(7,593) = 0.96505 [0.4559]
Normality test: χ2(2) = 5.1704 [0.0754]
Hetero test: F(27,562) = 1.9884 [0.0024]**
RESET23 test: F(2,573) = 0.95204 [0.3866]
The t-value for αcecm is 3.12, so we can reject αcecm = 0. This is con-
sistent with the consumption function interpretation, and shows that one
premise for an income multiplier is present: Consumption does error-correct
departures from equilibrium savings. The value of αyecm does not alter this
result. Another implication of our failure to reject αyecm = 0 is that the
saving for a rainy day hypothesis is not supported. We note that we fail to
reject the absence of heteroscedasticity. We attribute this to the volatility in
the monthly data.
Given the outcome of these tests, we can argue that the structural model
is not a simultaneous equation system. Note that this does not mean there
is no income multiplier, only that the multiplier process is "drawn out" in
time.
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4.3.1 Conditional Consumption Function
Based on the results above we can estimate a system made up of a conditional
consumption function (5), and a marginal equation for income (6). As error
correction only takes place in consumption, the coefficient in front of the
error correction term in (5) is the same coefficient as in the reduced form
estimated above. However, the coefficients in front of ∆yt−1 etc are new, due
to the conditioning on ∆yt. As a result of this, we introduce new symbols
for these coefficients.
∆ct = γc0∆yt + γc1∆yt−1 + γc2∆ct−1 + αcecm(yt−1 − βct−1 − s∗) + εct (5)
∆yt = αy1∆yt−1 + αy2∆ct−1 + εyt (6)
Estimating the empirical version of these equations gives us the following:
∆̂ct = − 0.001433
(0.000756)
− 0.2212
(0.0345)
∆ct−1 − 0.09091
(0.0346)
∆ct−2 − 0.07642
(0.0341)
∆ct−3
+ 0.1112
(0.0318)
∆ct−6 + 0.1371
(0.0326)
∆ct−7 + 0.1726
(0.0329)
∆ct−8 + 0.09824
(0.0329)
∆ct−9
+ 0.06268
(0.0315)
∆ct−11 + 0.2097
(0.0247)
∆yt + 0.1358
(0.0259)
∆yt−1 + 0.1105
(0.0258)
∆yt−2
+ 0.09431
(0.0259)
∆yt−3 − 0.03329
(0.024)
∆yt−9 − 0.04171
(0.0232)
∆yt−12
+ 0.02057
(0.00691)
ECMt−1
(7)
We note that the coefficient αcecm has not changed much in the condi-
tional version of the consumption function, and also note that ∆yt is highly
significant with a t-value of 8.48. The coefficient we estimate for ∆yt is
quite large indeed. We still observe similar results as previously from the
diagnostics.
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Table 6: Diagnostics for the Conditional Consumption Function
σ = 0.0041, 607 observations, R2 = 0.47
AR 1-7 test: F(7,567) = 1.6028 [0.1318]
ARCH 1-7 test: F(7,593) = 1.5979 [0.1331]
Normality test: χ2(2) = 4.8168 [0.0900]
Hetero test: F(36,556) = 2.1868 [0.0001]**
RESET23 test: F(2,572) = 0.56183 [0.5705]
∆̂yt = 0.001043
(0.00023)
− 0.1186
(0.0259)
∆yt−2 − 0.1049
(0.0258)
∆yt−3 + 0.08789
(0.0346)
∆ct−2
+ 0.1397
(0.0356)
∆ct−3 + 0.07249
(0.0333)
∆ct−8 + 0.1151
(0.0331)
∆ct−11
+ 0.09526
(0.033)
∆ct−12
(8)
Table 7: Diagnostics New Income Equation
σ = 0.0044, 607 observations, R2 = 0.66
AR 1-7 test: F(7,576) = 0.77902 [0.6051]
ARCH 1-7 test: F(7,593) = 3.9531 [0.0003]**
Normality test: χ2(2) = 56.455 [0.0000]**
Hetero test: F(27,572) = 1.3870 [0.1127]
RESET23 test: F(2,581) = 2.3512 [0.0962]
4.3.2 Dynamic Equation System
We can form a system of these two equations, which would allow us to expose
our model to shocks, and see how income and consumption evolve over time
in response to these shocks.
First we need to identify the system. Through our previous tests we
have concluded that we can form a recursive system, where current period
∆yt affects ∆ct, but where ∆ct has no effect on ∆yt. We therefore omit
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the error correction term from our equation for ∆yt. Finally, we omit the
consumption break dummies from the ∆yt equation, and vice versa for the
income break dummies. Our choice of estimation method for the system is
Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML). We expect the estimates of
the system to follow the previous estimations quite closely.
∆̂yt = 0.001041
(0.000231)
− 0.1186
(0.026)
∆yt−2 − 0.1047
(0.0259)
∆yt−3 + 0.0888
(0.0348)
∆ct−2
+ 0.1384
(0.0357)
∆ct−3 + 0.0717
(0.0334)
∆ct−8 + 0.116
(0.0333)
∆ct−11
+ 0.09723
(0.0329)
∆ct−12
∆̂ct = − 0.001385
(0.000757)
+ 0.1688
(0.0315)
∆yt + 0.1263
(0.0262)
∆yt−1 + 0.1024
(0.0261)
∆yt−2
+ 0.08702
(0.0261)
∆yt−3 − 0.03286
(0.0238)
∆yt−9 − 0.03775
(0.0232)
∆yt−12
− 0.2223
(0.0343)
∆ct−1 − 0.08678
(0.0349)
∆ct−2 − 0.06535
(0.0349)
∆ct−3
+ 0.1123
(0.0316)
∆ct−6 + 0.1326
(0.0324)
∆ct−7 + 0.1741
(0.0329)
∆ct−8
+ 0.09948
(0.0335)
∆ct−9 + 0.003524
(0.0323)
∆ct−10 + 0.06777
(0.0321)
∆ct−11
+ 0.02078
(0.00686)
ECMt−1
Table 8: System Diagnostics
607 observations
Vector SEM-AR 1-7 test: F(28,1126) = 1.3962 [0.0830]
Vector Normality test: χ2(4) = 64.935 [0.0000]**
Vector Hetero test: F(201,1611) = 1.3632 [0.0011]**
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These diagnostics are the system versions of the same tests previously
conducted under the single equation systems.
We observe low t-values on some of the lagged variables in both the income
and the consumption equation, and remove these from our system. Doing
so does not change the major results of exposing the model to shocks. This
new estimation gives us:
∆̂yt = 0.001134
(0.000225)
− 0.1219
(0.026)
∆yt−2 − 0.1054
(0.0259)
∆yt−3 + 0.1075
(0.0344)
∆ct−2
+ 0.1477
(0.0354)
∆ct−3 + 0.1108
(0.033)
∆ct−11 + 0.0999
(0.0328)
∆ct−12
∆̂ct = − 0.00148
(0.000753)
+ 0.1502
(0.0303)
∆yt + 0.1172
(0.026)
∆yt−1 + 0.08396
(0.0249)
∆yt−2
+ 0.06961
(0.025)
∆yt−3 − 0.2082
(0.0331)
∆ct−1 + 0.1116
(0.0319)
∆ct−6 + 0.1225
(0.0325)
∆ct−7
+ 0.151
(0.0322)
∆ct−8 + 0.07296
(0.0316)
∆ct−9 + 0.02101
(0.0069)
ECMt−1
Table 9: System Diagnostics
607 observations
Vector SEM-AR 1-7 test: F(28,1134) = 1.3238 [0.1213]
Vector Normality test: χ2(4) = 66.567 [0.0000]**
Vector Hetero test: F(201,1611) = 1.4029 [0.0004]**
Before we start looking at the dynamics of the model it would be inter-
esting to see how well the model would forecast the past year.
The solid line in Figure 8 shows the actual development of ∆yt and ∆ct,
while the bars show the corresponding 95% confidence intervals. The model
seems to predict the actual values quite well, and we observe no large forecast
errors for this time interval.
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Figure 8: 12 month forecast of ∆yt and ∆ct.
4.3.3 Dynamics
We can now expose this system to shocks of various kinds, and observe how
the economy responds to these shocks. The manner of shocks used enables
us to emulate certain traits of the financial crisis, and might give us an
indication of the effects of economic policies like the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009.
We begin by examining the effects of a temporary positive shock to ∆yt,
which could for instance be caused by fiscal policy. The size of the shock isn’t
important here, it would only affect the scales and we’re more interested in
the dynamics involved. We shock ∆yt by 0.4, which would translate into an
increase in income of 0.4%.
Figure 9 provides us with some interesting information. We see that the
effects of a single monthly shock linger on for a very long time, even though
the shock itself dissipates quickly. The figure also indicates that fiscal policy
needs quite some time after implementation to be effective. It takes several
years for the positive shock to income to have its full effect on ct. It is also
very interesting to see that the long-term effect is that the percentage change
in yt is larger than the initial value of the shock. This seems to indicate the
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Figure 9: The effects of a positive shock to income.
existence of a multiplier effect, which is essential to fiscal policy and has been
the subject of much debate as U.S. unemployment continued to rise after the
implementation of the ARRA.
In the case of a similar shock to consumption we see that the effects
start wearing off after approximately two years. The difference in magni-
tude compared to when the shock took place in income is larger than we
expected to see before modeling the dynamics. We also observe the error
correction taking place in consumption. An increase in consumption means
that the savings rate is below its long-run equilibrium. This adjusts con-
sumption down towards the value consistent with the long-run relationship
of the savings rate.
Finally, Figure 11 shows a simultaneous decrease in income and consump-
tion. One interpretation of this can be the onset of the financial crisis and
a loss of consumer confidence, although there were more complex forces at
work in reality than we can hope to capture in our simple model.
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Figure 10: The effects of a positive shock to consumption.
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Figure 11: The financial crisis in our model.
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5 Conclusions
It has been the ambition of this thesis to provide some background regarding
the causes of the financial crisis, and to highlight the lack of consensus in
modern macroeconomic theory. I have attempted to single out some of the
factors I believe have been of the greatest importance both in causing and
contributing to the financial crisis. It is interesting to note that at the time
of writing, November 2010, little has been done to change many of the under-
lying factors which helped create a global financial crisis. The global trade
imbalances remain, made evident by the United States recently accusing the
Chinese of mercantilism. Little has been done to regulate the U.S. financial
sector, and though there were substantial short-term gains by rescuing insti-
tutions which were deemed too big to fail, these rescues will have done little
to dampen any moral hazard problems present in financial institutions. The
potential problems connected to high bonuses and investors and investment
managers having misaligned incentives were covered in chapter 3, and when
Yngve Slyngstad, CEO of NBIM, defends18 paying out bonuses of several
billion NOK to investment managers, it would seem somewhat of an exag-
geration to say that these problems are taken very seriously by the financial
sector as a whole. To round up the summary of the descriptive part of the
thesis on a gloomy note: It seems highly unlikely that the current financial
crisis is the last of its kind.
In chapter 4 I estimated consumption functions with U.S. data in an at-
tempt to test whether the Keynesian consumption functions used in macroe-
conometric models, or consumption following an Euler equation like the
DSGE models assume, could find their respective assumptions backed up by
the data. From the estimated equations the conclusion was that the Keyne-
sian view was supported by the data. We found no support for consumption
following a random walk. Constructing a dynamic system and exposing it
to shocks revealed a possible multiplier effect, and showed the quite long
time span one must allow for before seeing the full effects of fiscal policy.
Without reading too much into the findings of such a simple model, these
18Article in Dagens Næringsliv, October 30, 2010.
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results are nevertheless interesting. Time constraints prevent me from refin-
ing the model before the deadline for submitting this thesis, but it might be
interesting to look further into this in the future.
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A Variable Description
All data used for estimations in this thesis has been extracted from FRED,
Federal Reserve Economic Data. The database is available at http://
research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/.
inccap_2005 is disposable income per capita, in chained 2005 dollars. The
data has been seasonally adjusted, and is of monthly frequency. Consump-
tion data was not available in in monthly, per capita, chained 2005 dollars.
To obtain this I downloaded personal consumption expenditures in billions
of dollars, seasonally adjusted and of monthly frequency. I then divided this
with an implicit price deflator to obtain the series in 2005 dollars, and also
divided the series by population data to obtain per capita numbers. The mea-
sure for population used, Total Population: All ages including Armed Forces
Overseas, was obtained from the same database. The resulting variable was
named ccap_2005 in the data set. The logs of inccap_2005 and ccap_2005
where denoted Linccap_2005 and Lccap_2005, and were presented as y and
c in the text, estimations and graphs. The differences of these logs were
named DLinccap_2005 and DLccap_2005, and were presented as ∆y and
∆c.
The data set and batch files used in PcGive are available on request, from
the author of this thesis.
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